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The Chemical Weapons Convention: Hollow 
Idealism or Capable Mechanism? The Syrian 
Intervention as a Test Case 
BY DAVID MARTIN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Once alarmed by the prospect of a unilateral American military 
strike to destroy Syria’s chemical weapons and chemical weapons fa-
cilities, the international community has been pleasantly surprised at the 
peaceful progress of the identification, location, and destruction of Syri-
an chemical weapons, enabled by the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC) framework.1 Considering the unique circumstances that culmi-
nated in the disarmament agreement struck between the international 
community and Syria, is the CWC framework responsible for the posi-
tive results thus far? Or is Syria’s accession to the CWC and subsequent 
consent to the inspection and destruction of its chemical weapons arse-
nal a fortunate anomaly? This article concludes that: (1) the bold, flexi-
ble framework of the CWC made it possible for peaceful disarmament 
in Syria; (2) the enforcement of the CWC in Syria serves to strengthen 
its stature as a capable mechanism for future enforcement of chemical 
weapons disarmament; and (3) the CWC framework can be a useful 
model for future and existing disarmament agreements. 
Section I of this article analyzes the background of chemical 
weapons use and regulation, highlighting why universal disarmament is 
vital to regional and universal stability. Section II discusses the legal 
framework of the CWC, pointing out the unique features that make it an 
 
* J.D., Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; Associate Attorney, Winstead PC. My heartfelt thank 
you to Jennifer Reiz for helping me develop the idea for this article. 
 1. Ajey Lele & Gunjan Singh, Syria’s Chemical Weapons Mess and Great Power Game, 
SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF PEACE AND CONFLICT (Sept. 26, 2013), 
www.sspconline.org/opinion/SyriasChemicalWeaponMess_GreatPowerGame_26092013. Con-
vention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-219, 
1974 U.N.T.S. 317 [hereinafter CWC]. 
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effective mechanism for chemical disarmament as compared to existing 
disarmament frameworks (particularly the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and the Biological Weapons Convention). Section III discusses 
the events leading up to the decision to enforce the CWC in response to 
Syria’s chemical weapons violations in 2013. Section IV analyzes the 
aspects of the CWC framework that have made implementation in Syria 
a success and those that could pose future challenges. Section V con-
cludes that the CWC framework, which enabled the peaceful coopera-
tion in the disarming of Syria, should not only serve as a model for re-
solving chemical weapons violations, but also for international 
disarmament agreements in general. 
I. BACKGROUND: HISTORY OF MODERN CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE AND 
REGULATION 
1. World War I 
Chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons share the same capacity 
to inflict mass casualties in one single attack.2 World War I ushered in 
the modern large-scale use of chemical weapons (CW).3 Both sides of 
that conflict used poisonous gasses to inflict excruciating suffering on 
one another and to significantly increase battlefield casualties.4 These 
weapons essentially consisted of widely known commercial chemicals 
placed into standard munitions such as grenades, artillery shells, and 
other explosives.5 Armed forces in World War I used at least twenty-
eight types of gases and sixteen different mixtures of gases during com-
bat.6 Such chemicals included chlorine (a respiratory irritant), phosgene 
(a choking agent), and mustard gas (which causes agonizing burns on 
the skin).7 The results of CW use in World War I were gruesome and 
costly,8 causing nearly 100,000 deaths9 and injuring approximately one 
million people.10 In addition to the physical cost of human life, CW use 
 
 2. Ramesh Thakur, Introduction: Chemical Weapons and the Challenge of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, in THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: IMPLEMENTATION, CHALLENGES, 
AND OPPORTUNITIES 1, 1 (Ramesh Thakur & Ere Haru eds., 2006). 
 3. BROOKS E. KLEBER & DALE BIRDSELL, THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE: 
CHEMICALS IN COMBAT 3, 3 (Stetson Conn ed., Ctr. of Military History, 2003). 
 4. Chemical Weapons, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS (UNODA), 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Chemical/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2013). 
 5. Id. 
 6. KLEBER & BIRDSELL, supra note 3, at 3. 
 7. Chemical Weapons, supra note 4. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Thakur, supra note 2, at 6.  
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inflicted a significant psychological toll on civilians: “[t]here can be no 
doubt that gas warfare emerged from World War I with the reputation 
of a horror weapon even when field experience did not substantiate this 
view.”11 Since World World I, chemical weapons have killed over one 
million people throughout the world.12 These statistics alone show the 
horrifying destructive capability of CW, and thus the need to rid the 
world of their existence. 
2. Geneva Protocol (1925) 
The Geneva Protocol, signed in 1925, was a response to the public 
outrage resulting from CW use in World War I.13 While a positive step, 
the Geneva Protocol was limited.14 The Protocol merely prohibited the 
use of chemical weapons against those states who were party to the trea-
ty; the protocol, however, “did not prohibit the development, production 
or stockpiling of chemical weapons.”15 Furthermore, many parties to the 
Protocol reserved the right to use prohibited weapons against states that 
were not party to the Agreement, and in response to any state that used 
CW against it.16 
3. Post-Geneva 
While some states have used chemical weapons since the Geneva 
Protocol, CW use has not been pervasive.17 Italy, however, used chemi-
cal weapons in small amounts against Ethiopia in the 1930s.18 Germany 
used poison gases in concentration camps in World War II, and Japan 
used gas against China in World War II as well.19 Since World War II, 
states have used chemical weapons in only a few cases: by Egypt in 
North Yemen in the 1960s,20 and more notably by Iraq against Iran and 
its own Kurdish population in the 1980s.21 Iraq’s CW use in the 1980s 
demonstrated that the effects of CW use can devastate and destabilize 
 
 11. KLEBER & BIRDSELL, supra note 3, at 653. The psychological harms of CW use are fur-
ther discussed later in the  
article. 
 12. Chemical Weapons, supra note 4. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id.; Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other 
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter 
Geneva Protocol].  
 16. Chemical Weapons, supra note 4. 
 17. See id.  
 18. THOMAS L. MCNAUGHER, BALLISTIC MISSILES AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS: THE 
LEGACY OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR 7 (1990). 
 19. Id. at 7; Chemical Weapons, supra note 4. 
 20. MCNAUGHER, supra note 18, at 7.  
 21. Id. at 22-23. 
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nations and populations on a regional and potentially universal scale.22 
a. Iraq’s chemical weapons use in the 1980s 
Iraq used chemical weapons as part of its arsenal during an ex-
tended conflict with Iran between 1982 and 1988.23 A 1991 U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency report estimated that Iran suffered thousands of 
deaths and tens of thousands of injuries as a result of Iraq’s CW use, 
which was spread out over multiple attacks.24 More alarming, “deferred 
symptoms from low-dose exposure [have] continued to plague both the 
civilian and military populations in Iran, producing thousands of addi-
tional deaths.”25 The Iraqi regime, led by Saddam Hussein, also directed 
chemical attacks against its own Kurdish population in retaliation for 
their alleged support of Iran in the ongoing conflict.26 Iraq’s CW use 
against the Kurds was responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands, 
including a single attack that killed 5,000.27 Commentators credit Iraq’s 
CW use as a major reason that Iran ultimately decided to negotiate a 
cease-fire that was favorable for Iraq, despite Iran’s superior military 
forces.28 
b. Physical and psychological effects 
Chemical weapons are effective because of their psychological as 
well as physical effects.29 The “special emotional and psychological ef-
fects” of chemical weapons on a state’s population could produce great-
er harm than the mere physical effects of traditional weapons.30 Chemi-
cal weapons have been dubbed as weapons of “political terror rather 
than military force.”31 Using the Iraq-Iran conflict as an example, 
“[Iraq’s] threats to use CW against enemy civilians . . . did, apparently, 
produce a drop in morale.”32 Iraq’s CW use inflicted psychological inju-
ry on a large segment of the population: “[t]here is little doubt that 
chemical weapons . . . played a role in sharply lowering the morale of 
 
 22. Id. at 32. 
 23. See id. at 8, 17. 
 24. Robin Wright, Chemical Arms’ Effect Linger Long After War, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 19, 
2002), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2002/nov/19/world/fg-chemwar19. 
 25. Margaret Sewell, Freedom from Fear: Prosecuting the Iraqi Regime for the use of 
Chemical Weapons, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 365, 371 (2004). 
 26. Id. at 372. 
 27. Id. at 373. 
 28. MCNAUGHER, supra note 18, at 5, 8. 
 29. Id. at 22.  
 30. See id. at 22. 
 31. Thakur, supra note 2, at 2. 
 32. MCNAUGHER, supra note 18, at 22.  
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Iranian citizens and soldiers.”33 In addition to Iraq’s actual use of chem-
ical weapons, the mere threat of CW use against Iran greatly increased 
“the sense of panic that already gripped Tehran’s residents . . . [f]or a 
city already in panic, the threat of CW seems to have exacerbated the 
problem, perhaps substantially.”34 CW use also had a special emotional 
and psychological impact on its observers: journalists interviewing 
Kurdish leaders found them to be “fatalistic” after observing the fallout 
from a chemical weapons attack on unprepared rebels and civilians.35 
Iraq’s CW use in the 1980s put the world on alert: both to the continued 
destructive effect of CW and also to how powerful a state could become 
when in possession of CW. 
c. Toward proliferation and grim possibilities 
The Cold War brought upon “significant development, manufac-
ture and stockpiling of chemical weapons.”36 In addition to the arms 
competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, smaller 
regional powers and rogue nations have also viewed chemical weapons 
as a quick and easy way to gain power.37 Some third-world countries,  
such as Iraq, considered chemical weapons as “the poor man’s nuclear 
bomb,” enabling a state to inflict significant physical and psychological 
damage on another, thereby wielding a great deal of political leverage to 
achieve its ends.38 An estimated twenty-five states were developing 
chemical weapons capabilities by the 1970s and 80s.39 
Notwithstanding the psychological toll of CW, the physical conse-
quences remain harrowing: in addition to the ability to cause death, 
chemical weapons can also cause blindness, blistering, burning, lung 
damage, skin discoloration, involuntary urination and defecation, vomit-
ing, twitching, convulsions, paralysis, and unconsciousness.40 From a 
military-strategic standpoint, however, chemical weapons are not “near-
ly magical devices” that ensure victory on the battlefield.41 Modern 
chemical battlefield equipment such as masks and suits can adequately 
counter chemical weapons’ physical effects, especially when soldiers 
 
 33. Id. at 6. 
 34. Id. at 22.  
 35. Id. 
 36. Chemical Weapons, supra note 4. 
 37. Sewell, supra note 25, at 367. 
 38. MCNAUGHER, supra note 18, at 6. 
 39. Chemical Weapons, supra note 4.  
 40. Sewell, supra note 25, at 371-72.  
 41. MCNAUGHER, supra note 18, at 21. 
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are well-trained.42 Furthermore, difficulties in storing, transporting, and 
dispersing chemical weapons, as well as the need for large quantities of 
CW in order to be effective, somewhat limit their military utility.43 Nev-
ertheless, CW makes war more than just “uncomfortable,” even for 
properly equipped and prepared soldiers.44 
Not surprisingly, and perhaps more ominously, “chemical weapons 
are grimly effective when used against unprotected civilians.”45 The 
threat of a chemical attack on a major city with a dense population is a 
primary concern.46 Some of the special qualities of chemical weapons 
make them particularly effective if dispersed in an urban setting.47 
Chemical agents “would seep into basements and bunkers that conven-
tional bombs would [normally] leave untouched.”48 Chemicals’ ability 
to linger, especially if they entered closed rooms, “extend[] their lethali-
ty (depending on the agent) over hours, days, or perhaps weeks.”49 Fi-
nally, instead of being dissipated by the winds of open terrain, the dis-
persion of chemical weapons in cities might be constrained by walls and 
buildings, causing even more casualties.50 While there have been few 
chemical attacks on major cities, in 1995, an underground religious sect, 
Aum Shinrikyo, unleashed a terrorist attack on a Tokyo subway using a 
nerve gas called “sarin,” which resulted in ten deaths, thousands injured, 
and millions terrorized.51 Officials opined that “[h]ad their delivery ca-
pability not been so primitive, the death toll would have been substan-
tially larger.”52 
Although chemical weapons do not have the same magnitude of 
destructive capability as nuclear weapons, states fear CW proliferation 
in part because of the potential for a “strategic marriage” of chemical 
warheads atop ballistic missiles. Achieving such a potent combination 
would place leaders of less developed, ill-intentioned countries in a po-
sition to create a “delicate balance of terror.”53 In return, a state seeking 
to block such a power grab might entertain preemption, creating even 
 
 42. See id. at 19.  
 43. Thakur, supra note 2, at 2. 
 44. MCNAUGHER, supra note 18, at 21. 
 45. Id. at 22. 
 46. See id. at 30.  
 47. Id. 
 48. Id.  
 49. Id.  
 50. MCNAUGHER, supra note 18, at 30. 
 51. Thakur, supra note 2, at 6. 
 52. Id. 
 53. MCNAUGHER, supra note 18, at 24. 
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more instability.54 Israeli strategist Gerald Steinberg commented that 
“[t]he introduction of missiles reduces critical decision making time to a 
few minutes. In a crisis, states that face the possibility of a missile at-
tack involving chemical . . . warheads will be strongly induced to launch 
a preemptive strike.”55 Indeed, states enduring the horror of a ballistic 
missile chemical attack and regional alliances to which they belong 
(such as NATO, the African Union, and the League of Arab States) 
would have legal authority to retaliate proportionally according to the 
UN Charter.56 Article 52 of the UN Charter recognizes the right of re-
gional security alliances to “maintain . . . international peace and securi-
ty as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such . . . activities 
are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.”57 
Without the development of secure second-strike capabilities, the 
proliferation of chemically-armed ballistic missiles brought to the world 
the prospect of a new and dangerous source of instability, especially in 
the Middle East, a region already well known for its volatility.58 While 
chemical warheads were not attached atop ballistic missiles during the 
Iran-Iraq War (CW were deployed by more conventional means), the 
potential for their combined use for more accurate and lethal strikes on 
unprepared populations caused increased concern for proliferation, 
prompting the creation of new institutions aimed at curbing key ele-
ments of these technologies.59 By the late 1980s, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Syria, 
and Egypt possessed the requisite missile technology and chemical 
manufacturing facilities to combine CW and ballistic missile capabili-
ties.60 The groundwork was set for what would ultimately become the 
most comprehensive treaty calling for the complete eradication of an 
entire class of weapon: The Chemical Weapons Convention.61 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Jordan J. Paust, Use of Military Force in Syria by Turkey, NATO, and the United States, 
34 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 431, 435-36 (2012). 
 57. Id. (quoting U.N. Charter Art. 52). 
 58. MCNAUGHER, supra note 18, at 24.  
 59. Id. at 25. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Robert J. Mathews, The First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention: 
A Drafter’s Perspective, in THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: IMPLEMENTATION, 
CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES  44, 44 (Ramesh Thakur & Ere Haru eds., 2006).   
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II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: AN 
AGREEMENT WITH BITE 
1. Chemical Weapons Convention Overview 
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) provides a strong 
framework for the worldwide destruction of chemical weapons, with its 
key feature being a powerful enforcement mechanism to bring about 
compliance.62 The UN Charter, signed at the end of WWII, planted the 
seed for future arms regulation.63 Article 11 of the UN Charter states 
that the General Assembly may consider “principles governing dis-
armament and regulation of armaments” to further international cooper-
ation, peace, and security.64 After twelve years of negotiating, the CWC 
was finally adopted by the Conference on Disarmament in September 
1992, opened for signature in Paris in January 1993, and entered into 
force on April 29, 1997.65 
The provisions in the CWC are bold. Indeed, the CWC is the first 
multilateral disarmament agreement that calls for the “elimination of an 
entire category of weapons of mass destruction under universally ap-
plied international control,” which includes the inspection, verification, 
and destruction of chemical weapons.66 The CWC is also notable for its 
collaboration with the global chemicals industry and the industry’s on-
going cooperation with the Convention’s industrial verification re-
gime.67 “[T]he Convention encourages international cooperation among 
countries in the peaceful uses of chemicals and provides assistance and 
protection to signatories” that are under actual, or the threat of, chemical 
attack.68  One hundred and eighty-nine nations, now including Syria, are 
parties to the CWC, which represents about 98% of the world’s popula-
tion.69 To date, only six states have yet to become a party to the CWC: 
Israel, Myanmar, Angola, Egypt, North Korea, and South Sudan.70 Of 
those six countries, only Israel and Myanmar have signed the treaty.71 
 
 62. Chemical Weapons, supra note 4. 
 63. See U.N. Charter  art. 11, para. 1. 
 64. Id.; Disarmament in the General Assembly, UNODA, 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/GA.shtml (last visited Sept. 4, 2014).  
 65. Chemical Weapons, supra note 4. CWC, supra note 1. 
 66. See id. (emphasis added). 
 67. Thakur, supra note 2. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Chemical Weapons, supra note 4. 
 70. About the OPCW, ORGANIZATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
(OPCW), http://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/non-member-states/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2014).  
 71. Id.  
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2. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW): 
A Big Stick 
The defining feature of the CWC framework is that it allows for 
“stringent verification of compliance by States Parties.”72 The CWC ac-
complished this by creating a commission, the Organization for the Pro-
hibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague, the Netherlands, 
specifically to oversee the CWC’s implementation.73 Article VIII, para-
graph 34 of the CWC calls for an Executive Council of the OPCW to 
conclude agreements with states party to the CWC, collectively called 
the Conference of the States Parties, on behalf of the OPCW.74 The Ex-
ecutive Council consists of representatives of forty-one states parties, 
who are elected for two-year terms, and meet four to five times per 
year.75 The Conference of States Parties includes all the CWC states and 
meets annually.76 A Technical Secretariat possesses the day-to-day ad-
ministration and implementation responsibilities of the Convention, in-
cluding inspections, and is under the leadership of a Director-General 
who his appointed at the Executive Council’s recommendation.77 The 
UN and the OPCW formed a legally binding relationship that entered 
into force in May 2001.78 
The OPCW’s purpose is to implement the provisions of the CWC 
and to ensure a “credible, transparent regime to verify the destruction of 
chemical weapons.”79 Through its mandate to achieve the object and 
purpose of the CWC, the OPCW has four goals: 
(1) overseeing and verifying the destruction of all existing chemi-
cal weapons under international verification by the OPCW; (2) “moni-
toring [the] chemical industry to prevent new weapons from re-
emerging;” (3) “providing assistance and protection to States Parties 
against chemical threats;” and (4) “fostering international cooperation to 
strengthen implementation of the Convention and promot[ing] the 
 
 72. Chemical Weapons, supra note 4. 
 73. Id.  
 74. CWC art. 8, para. 34. 
 75. Thakur, supra note 2, at 8. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Decision of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion, ORGANIZATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, Doc. C-VI/DEC.5 (May 
17, 2001), available at http://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=4315; 
Agreement Concerning the Relationship Between the UN and the OPCW, U.N. Doc. 
A/Res/55/283 (Sept. 24, 2001), available at  
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/55/283 [hereinafter U.N. Doc. 
A/Res/55/283] 
 79. Chemical Weapons, supra note 4. 
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peaceful use of chemistry,”80 which includes deactivating, destroying, or 
converting to peaceful purposes all chemical weapons production facili-
ties.81 This means that while the OPCW seeks the destruction of existing 
chemical weapons stockpiles, it also works to both persuade the small 
number of states yet to join the Convention to renounce CW and also to 
prevent the proliferation of CW by non-party states.82  The OPCW must 
also keep an eye on those areas seeking to re-stock CW to prevent old 
threats from re-emerging.83 
3. Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigating Alleged Chemical 
Weapons Use 
In 1987, prior to the CWC’s entry into force, the UN and Member 
States granted the UN Secretary-General authority to investigate the al-
leged uses of chemical, biological, or toxin weapons through legal au-
thority called The Secretary-General’s Mechanism (SGM),84 which 
passed as Security Council Resolution 620.85  Under the SGM frame-
work, UN member states may request that the Secretary-General inves-
tigate alleged CW use.86 The Secretary-General is then authorized to 
send fact-finding teams to the site (or sites) of the alleged incident and 
report back to the UN.87 The object of such an investigation would be to 
ascertain any violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol’s ban on CW use 
or other customary international law.88 The key elements of the SGM 
are the roster of experts and laboratories provided by UN member states 
and the Guidelines and Procedures for the conduct of investigations en-
dorsed by the General Assembly in 1990.89 
The SGM plays a role in the CWC framework, because the OPCW 
is authorized by the CWC to conduct investigations in cases of alleged 
chemical weapons use by States Parties.90 However, as provided by the 
 
 80. About the OPCW, supra note 70; see Chemical Weapons, supra note 4. 
 81. Thakur, supra note 2, at 8. 
 82. See About the OPCW, supra note 70.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Bio-
logical Weapons, UNODA, http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Secretary-
General_Mechanism/ [hereinafter Secretary-General’s Investigation.]; 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Secretary-General_Mechanism/; Secretary General’s 
Mechanism, G.A. Res. A/RES/42/37C. (Nov. 30, 1987). 
 85. S.C. Res. 620, U.N. Doc. S/RES/620 (Aug. 26, 1988), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/620%281988%29.). 
 86. Secretary-General’s Investigation, supra note 84.  
 87. Id. 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id.; U.N. Doc. A/44/561 Annex I (1990). 
 90. Secretary-General’s Investigation, supra note 84. 
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CWC, in cases of alleged use of chemical weapons by non-parties, the 
OPCW must closely cooperate with the Secretary-General,91 and must 
place its resources at the disposal of the Secretary-General if so request-
ed.92 In September 2012, the UN and the OPCW concluded an agree-
ment that set forth the means and procedures of cooperation between the 
two bodies for conducting an investigation in such circumstances.93 Pri-
or to the recent investigation of alleged CW use in Syria, the SGM was 
used to investigate alleged CW use in Mozambique and Azerbaijan in 
1992,94 but found no evidence of use in those instances.95 
4. Potent Features of the CWC 
The CWC has several hallmark features that enable it to be effec-
tive in eliminating the use, stockpiling, development, and proliferation 
of chemical weapons. Among those are (1) a wide scope and compre-
hensive set of prohibitions; (2) permitting flexibility in the means by 
which to accomplish those ends; (3) an effective challenge and verifica-
tion protocol; (4) provisions that incentivize national implementation of 
legislation to meet CWC goals; and (5) provisions for persistent efforts 
to achieve universal adoption of the CWC. 
a. A Comprehensive Set of Prohibitions 
Overall, negotiators successfully agreed on a broad scope and a 
comprehensive set of prohibitions in the CWC.96 Importantly, they for-
mulated a definition of “chemical weapons,” which was among the 
more significant aspects of the Convention.97 Article II of the CWC sets 
forth the definition of CW, which covers toxic and precursor chemicals, 
munitions, and devices specifically designed for chemical weapons pur-
poses, as well as any equipment specifically designed for direct use in 
the employment of such munitions and devices.98 
 
 91. U.N. Doc. A/Res/55/283, supra note 78. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id.  
 94. FAQ about the U.N. Mission to investigate the Allegations of the Use of Chemical 
Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, UNITED NATIONS INFORMATION SERVICE (Sept. 5, 2013), 
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/2013/FAQs_about_the_UN_Mission_to_investigate_the_alleg
ed_use_of_chemical_weapons_in_Syria.pdf [hereinafter FAQ about UN Mission to Investigate]. 
 95. Gregory D. Koblentz, Probing for Chemical Attacks in Syria, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/syria/probing-chemical-attacks-syria/p30318. 
 96. Ralf Trapp, The Chemical Weapons Convention – Multilateral Instrument With a Fu-
ture, in THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: IMPLEMENTATION, CHALLENGES, AND 
OPPORTUNITIES 15, 19 (Ramesh Thakur & Ere Haru eds., 2006).   
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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Crucially different from other international arms agreements, the 
CWC classifies components of chemical weapons in themselves as pro-
hibited chemical weapons.99  Article II focuses on the specific chemi-
cal’s intended purpose rather than the degree of toxicity as a defining 
criterion.100 “Any toxic or precursor chemical is regarded as a chemical 
weapon unless it has been developed, produced, stockpiled, or used for 
purposes not prohibited, and only as long as types and quantities are 
consistent with such purposes.”101 This definition, along with the States 
Parties’ undertakings in Article I to “never, under any circumstances” 
develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain or stockpile, transfer direct-
ly or indirectly to anyone, or use chemical weapons, provides “a long-
lasting safeguard” to ensure that the object and purpose of the CWC is 
not defeated due to definitional loopholes.102 
b. The Verification and Challenge System 
In addition to a comprehensive prohibition at the heart of the 
CWC, the States Parties also agreed on effective mechanisms for com-
pliance verification. The CWC requires States Parties to: (1) declare all 
CW, CW production facilities, and related matters, and to submit them 
to international inspection; (2) declare all “relevant chemical activities 
and facilities undertaken 
. . . for legitimate purposes” and to submit them to international in-
spection; and (3) “inform the OPCW of their national implementation 
measures,” which are to include actions such as implementing “penal 
legislation and enforcing trade regulations designed to stem the prolifer-
ation of relevant chemicals to states not party to the CWC.”103 Granted, 
the system relies, to a considerable degree, on the States Parties’ own 
submissions to the OPCW and thus, “a bona fide presumption of hones-
ty and intent to comply” exists.104 Still, the CWC is “justifiably regarded 
as setting the benchmark for verification in a multilateral arms control 
treaty.”105 
However, the CWC, does provide mechanisms to verify facts in-
dependently and to address and resolve compliance doubts, including 
those with respect to undeclared facilities.106 Article IX and the Verifi-
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cation Annex (VA) outline a “challenge inspection” protocol107 based on 
the principles of “short notice, anytime, anywhere, [with] no right of re-
fusal,” which was “quite a novelty” among both international and even 
regional arms agreements.108 The challenge inspection system has been 
recognized as “the ultimate guardian of the effective implementation of, 
and strict compliance with, the Convention.”109 Paragraphs 8 through 25 
of Article IX of the CWC outline the OPCW’s authority to conduct on-
site inspections in a territory within “the jurisdiction or control of a 
State Party” whenever a State Party’s non-compliance is brought to the 
OPCW’s attention.”110 This inspection authority is incredibly important 
because of its deterrent effect.111 In addition to exposing and remedying 
non-compliance, a challenge inspection also serves a dual-purpose of 
establishing that there had been no breach of the CWC in questionable 
cases, which would enhance confidence among States Parties that states 
had complied with their obligations.112 
A challenge request must specify the State Party to be inspected, 
the inspection team’s point of entry, the size and type of the inspection 
site, the concern regarding the possible non-compliance, and the name 
of the observer of the requesting State Party.113 The only way to block 
the request is if a three-quarter majority of the Executive Council’s for-
ty-one members is “against carrying out the challenge inspection . . . 
[because it would] be frivolous, abusive, or clearly beyond the scope of 
th[e] Convention.”114 The requesting State Party would first request to 
inspect a designated perimeter, and if the inspected state objects to the 
proposed perimeter, the requesting state will designate an alternative pe-
rimeter, which will become the designated area and bar further negotia-
tions.115 The inspection team must notify the inspected State of the point 
of entry at least twelve hours in advance of its arrival, and the inspected 
State must grant entry to the inspection team within 108 hours after the 
inspection team arrives at the point of entry.116 The OPCW will take into 
account any domestic challenges that the inspected State might be un-
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der.117 
c. National Implementation 
The CWC requires States Parties to enact and implement national 
laws that ensure the international ban on chemical weapons is reflected 
in national laws. The CWC also requires that any violator can be “ap-
prehended, prosecuted and punished no matter where an offence is 
committed.”118 International law traditionally expects countries to take 
domestic implementation measures to ensure that their citizens follow 
the rules of any agreement struck between states, which are typically a 
matter of state sovereignty and constitutional framework.119 The CWC 
is “somewhat more specific,” requiring States Parties to: 1) “adopt [the] 
necessary measures to implement the Convention;” 2) adopt the neces-
sary measures to ensure that potentially harmful chemicals within state 
borders are used only for permitted purposes; and 3) “cooperate with 
other States Parties and afford legal assistance . . . in the context of . . . 
sharing information for prosecution purposes.”120 Furthermore, since the 
wake of the 9/11 attacks, states are now required to adopt and enforce 
legislation prohibiting “any non-state actor to manufacture, acquire, 
possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biologi-
cal weapons and their means of delivery.”121 
The CWC requires each State Party “to designate or establish a 
National Authority to ensure the effective implementation of the 
CWC.”122 The National Authority makes initial and annual declarations 
on chemical weapons stockpiles and facilities, “coordinates and partici-
pates in the receipt of OPCW inspections of industrial and military 
sites,” participates in assisting states under chemical attack or threat of 
chemical attack, and “promotes the peaceful use of chemicals.”123 “The 
National Authority is thus the focal point in a country’s interaction with 
other countries and the OPCW.”124 While OPCW inspections could al-
ways raise domestic sovereignty and constitutional issues, the CWC’s 
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intensive efforts of encouraging and enabling States Parties to set up 
their own national implementation scheme is invaluable. 
d. Flexibility 
Another defining feature of the CWC is that its provisions allow 
for flexibility in achieving its ends. The mandate given to the OPCW 
through Article VIII itself is very broad: “to achieve the object and pur-
pose of the Convention, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, 
including those for international verification of compliance with it, and 
to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Par-
ties.”125 
Article VIII also calls upon the OPCW to conduct inspections in 
the least intrusive manner possible by requiring it to protect confidenti-
ality and to use scientific advances to increase the effectiveness of veri-
fication.126 The OPCW was thus conceived as a “learning organization 
that would adapt to new developments in science and technology.”127 
Through the call of Article VIII to “provide a forum for consulta-
tion . . . among States Parties,”128 the OPCW’s mandate is by no means 
limited to the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles. In addition to 
destruction, the mandate also allows States Parties to address new secu-
rity challenges related to chemical weapons, adjust the implementation 
process to new requirements, and adapt the regime as necessary.129 In a 
sense, the CWC sets up a formal dialogue between the States Parties 
and the OPCW, both of which work to modify a living document that is 
the CWC. The Conference of the States Parties is encouraged to “make 
recommendations and take decisions on any questions, matters or issues 
related to [the] Convention.”130 
The CWC also provides flexibility by allowing a state to take pro-
tective security measures in the event that it comes under threat of, or 
actual, chemical attack.131 Article X of the CWC “provide[s] for a varie-
ty of mechanisms to deal with possible future CW threats”, and “calls 
for enhanced cooperation between the parties in exchanging equipment 
for protective purposes.”132 According to Ralf Trapp, the Convention 
was clearly drafted as a “flexible and adaptable legal instrument” capa-
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ble of withstanding time constraints, scientific and technological ad-
vances, economic changes, and security in general.133 
The Convention is unique in that there are two different processes 
to amend or change its provisions.134 In addition to a typical amendment 
procedure, which risks “unraveling previously existing consensus,” the 
Convention also provides for a “simplified procedure called a 
‘change’,” to be used when the proposed adjustment is already widely 
agreed upon.135  This innovative process made it possible to “adjust 
technical and administrative procedures that might in [the] future turn 
out to be impractical, insufficient, technically obsolete, or otherwise in 
need of adaptation.”136 Some early proposals for changes have demon-
strated that the OPCW is “indeed capable of going through technical/
administrative change” and that the apparatus “can be utilized to adjust 
the technicalities of CWC implementation to new [ ] conditions in the 
real world.”137 
Lastly, the CWC shows flexibility in the means by which it incen-
tivizes non-parties to join the Convention. Rather than a “one size fits 
all” means of accession to the Convention, the CWC language encour-
ages “bilateral, regional, and appropriate measures” on the part of the 
OPCW Technical Secretariat to facilitate non-parties to join and comply 
with the Convention.138 This flexibility is key because “if there were a 
growing perception that the CWC, and hence the OPCW, were no long-
er suited to dealing with the changing threats posed by chemical weap-
ons today and in the future, the ramifications would strike at the heart of 
the Convention itself, and “go far beyond the chemical weapons are-
na.”139  By allowing states to address their concerns in a bilateral or re-
gional context, they can feel more secure and confident that their needs 
will be met when joining the CWC, increasing the likelihood that those 
states will join the Convention. 
e. Universality 
The CWC unabashedly calls for the destruction of chemical weap-
ons, which can only become possible if the Convention becomes uni-
versal.140 While the word “universality” does not explicitly appear in the 
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text, the CWC’s Preamble nevertheless refers to “progress towards gen-
eral and complete disarmament under strict and effective international 
control,” total exclusion of the possibility of CW use, and “the complete 
and effective prohibition of . . . chemical weapons.’”141 These goals im-
plicitly call for a universal adherence by all states and jurisdictions, 
since they cannot be accomplished without it.142 Initial sessions of the 
Conference of the States Parties referred to a plan of action “inspired by 
the objective of achieving universal adherence to the Convention ten 
years after its entry into force.”143 While progress towards universality 
has been largely “rapid and steady,” the remaining states not party to the 
Convention will likely take more time and provide plenty of challeng-
es.144 
Under the Universality Action Plan, a Director of External Rela-
tions from the Technical Secretariat’s office was selected to invite 
States Parties to designate points of contact in regions and sub-regions 
in which universality needs special promotion.145 These points of con-
tact communicate with non-party states to educate them on the econom-
ic and political benefits of joining the Convention.146 The OPCW Tech-
nical Secretariat’s engagement with regional and sub-regional 
organizations, as well as targeted bilateral assistance from itself and 
States Parties has since furthered the push toward universality.147 While 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Biological Weap-
ons Convention (BWC) have many of the same parties in common with 
the CWC, only sixty parties to the NPT have consented to broader rights 
of inspection than previously authorized, and the BWC lacks any kind 
of verification mechanism, unlike the CWC.148 Therefore, the CWC’s 
near-universality seems more meaningful.149 
The Conference of the States Parties affirmed all of the aforemen-
tioned aspects of the CWC in April 2013 at the Third Review Confer-
ence, including: (1) reviewing “relevant scientific and technological de-
velopments;” (2) acknowledging new parties to the Convention while 
maintaining universality as a goal; (3) reaffirming all States Parties’ ef-
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forts to destroy CW within its control and affirming universal destruc-
tion of CW as the object and purpose of the treaty; and (4) asserting that 
“full, effective, and non-discriminatory” implementation of the  verifi-
cation scheme is essential for realizing that purpose.”150 
But is the CWC really as capable and radical as some commenta-
tors suggest? Will its provisions realistically enable the world to be free 
of chemical weapons? One critic remains cautious and questioned 
whether the international community could sustain the political will to 
enforce and achieve the objectives of the CWC, which would require 
unceasing energy and constant adaptation to changing technology and 
security environments.151 Another pundit pointed out “serious challeng-
es,” in the coming years, including: universality, maintaining compe-
tence of the technical secretariat, and obtaining full adherence by States 
Parties to the CWC’s legislative requirements.152 Others suggested that 
the biggest challenge to the credibility of the CWC was that the chal-
lenge system had “neither [been] used nor requested.”153 It seemed that 
in order for the CWC to truly demonstrate its capability as a new and 
more capable disarmament mechanism, it needed a real-world test. That 
test came in Syria in 2013. 
III. TESTING THE LIMITS OF THE CWC: SYRIA’S 2013 CHEMICAL 
WEAPONS USE 
Use of chemical weapons in Syria during its civil war in 2013 put 
the CWC framework to the test that many had wondered whether it 
could withstand. The CWC, OPCW, and the Secretary-General’s Mech-
anism all played a role in the 2013 allegation, verification, and destruc-
tion of chemical weapons in Syria. While many critics doubted whether 
the international framework could effectively succeed in the midst of 
political and practical pressures, the application of the CWC in Syria 
demonstrated that it is a strong and able mechanism fit for the task of 
the universal destruction of CW. The CWC’s credibility was not only 
strengthened, but the drafters of existing and future arms treaties could 
now look to the CWC as a model to emulate in order to maximize effec-
tiveness. 
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1. Allegation 
While the media devoted much attention to the use of chemical 
weapons during the Syrian Civil War in August 2013,154 the Syrian gov-
ernment actually first reported the use of chemical weapons on March 
19, 2013 in the Khan Al-Asal area of the Aleppo Governorate.155 The 
next day, Syria requested the Secretary-General to initiate an investiga-
tion under the authority of the SGM, rather than the CWC, since Syria 
was not yet a party to the convention.156  The Secretary-General assured 
the international community that all credible allegations would be inves-
tigated and would dispatch a special team of experts comprised of indi-
viduals from the OPCW and World Health Organization to investigate 
three of the reported incidents.157 
Shortly after the team’s arrival in Damascus on August 18, 2013,158 
reports emerged that chemical weapons were allegedly used in a major 
attack in the Ghouta area of Damascus.159 UN Member States requested 
that the Secretary-General order an investigation “making use of the 
Mission already in Syria,” to which the Secretary-General assented on 
August 22.160 That same day, the UN Security Council held an emer-
gency meeting in which the Council’s President encouraged a “thor-
ough, impartial, and prompt investigation” of whether chemical weap-
ons were used.161 The Secretary-General also ordered his High 
Representative for Disarmament Affairs travel to Damascus to ensure 
that the Syrian Government cooperated so that the incident in Ghouta 
could be properly investigated.162 Syria granted permission to the inves-
tigative team and the Mission commenced its on-site work the next 
day.163 
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2. Verification and Violation 
On September 16, 2013, the initial findings of the OPCW Mission 
team determined that chemical weapons were used in the attack on 
Ghouta.164 The Mission found: (1) impacted and exploded surface-to-
surface rockets still found to contain sarin; (2) environments around the 
rocket impact sites contaminated with sarin; (3) a number of survivors 
who clearly demonstrated symptoms of exposure to chemical com-
pounds; and (4) virtually all blood samples taken from the survivors 
were found positive for sarin.165 
In a note transmitting the findings of the Mission to the Security 
Council and General Assembly, the Secretary-General expressed “pro-
found shock and regret” that chemical weapons were indeed used in 
Syria.166 Moreover, the Secretary-General pointed out that the use was 
on a large scale, resulting in numerous casualties, particularly among 
civilians, which included many children.167 He condemned “in the 
strongest possible terms” the use of chemical weapons and asserted that 
the CW use was a war crime, a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, 
and a violation of customary international law.168 
While the Mission was required to determine whether chemical 
weapons were used, it was not required to determine who used them.169 
The Governments of Syria, Russia, and Iran claimed that opposition re-
bels were responsible for the attack.170 While who is responsible re-
mains an open question for the UN, the nature of the Missions findings 
appear to suggest blame on the Syrian Government.171 
3. Consent and Accession 
Opinions of how to respond to Syria’s chemical weapons use var-
ied. The United States considered a unilateral military strike,172 citing 
Syria’s “flagrant actions” as being in violation of international norms, 
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laws of war, and threats to the security of the Middle East and the Unit-
ed States respectively.173 The U.S. pointed out that an overwhelming 
majority of nations were parties to the CWC.174 Syria, however, was not 
a party to the CWC at the time of the August 2013 attack in the Ghouta 
region.175 As a result, the UN asserted that Syria’s use of chemical 
weapons violated the 1925 Geneva Protocol (which banned the use of 
chemical weapons), rather than the CWC, and that the Secretary-
General had authority under the SGM to investigate alleged CW use by 
states not party to the CWC.176 
Critics asserted that Syria’s use of CW posed a serious challenge 
for the international community and the OPCW.177 While “[v]erified de-
struction of chemical weapons facilities by the OPCW would validate 
its commitment to disarmament and global peace,” some doubted 
whether the OPCW even had a legal mandate to intervene at all, since 
Syria was not party to the CWC.178 Furthermore, observers opined that 
the role of the Syrian government would be crucial in facilitating 
OPCW inspections, because it would have to ensure the inspectors’ 
safety while they carried out their investigation in the midst of a civil 
war.179 Complicating matters more was the difficulty of determining the 
exact number of deaths in the midst of a chaotic war zone, inevitably in-
fluenced by the agendas of nations seeking to craft an appropriate re-
sponse or lack of response.180 Estimates of the death toll ranged from 
281 to roughly 1,500 persons in Damascus.181 
The U.S. plan for force was widely opposed domestically and 
abroad.182 Britain’s Prime Minister supported a potential American in-
tervention, but its Parliament rejected the plan.183 President Obama mus-
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tered support from only half of the G-20 members.184 UN Members dis-
agreed about threatening Syria with use force, and many countries 
adopted a wait-and-see approach.185 The international community ap-
peared to be in a stalemate.186 Would Syria’s CW use go unpunished 
and therefore make a mockery of the international community, the 1925 
Geneva Protocol, the aims of the CWC, and customary international 
law? 
Making matters more serious, experts believed Syria’s chemical 
weapons program to be extensive.187 Intelligence suggested that Syria 
had at least a dozen geographically dispersed sites associated with the 
storage, production, and preparation of some 1,000 tons of chemicals as 
well as missile warheads, aerial bombs, and artillery rockets that could 
be used to deliver those agents.188 
Meanwhile, while the international community awaited the find-
ings of the investigatory mission of alleged CW use in Syria, the U.S. 
began discussing alternatives to military force with Russia.189  The U.S.-
Russia negotiations cleared an initial hurdle by agreeing on the scale of 
Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile, and it cleared a second hurdle 
when the U.S. was willing to delay immediate military action.190 The 
U.S., however, continued to assert that an ultimate threat of force, per-
haps through a Chapter 7 UN resolution, was vital to any successful dis-
armament of Syria.191 President Obama maintained that any agreement 
with Russia and Syria must be “verifiable and enforceable.”192 
Perhaps seeking a safe haven in anticipation of the official UN 
findings of CW use in Syria, the Syrian Government decided to accede 
to the CWC on September 14, 2013, which entered into force on Octo-
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ber 14, 2013, when it also accepted the findings of the UN Mission.193 
Also on September 14, 2013, the U.S. and Russia agreed on a frame-
work for the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons.194 
a. The United States-Russia Framework 
The US-Russia Framework for the Elimination of Syrian Chemical 
Weapons facilitated fulfillment of Syria’s new obligations under the 
CWC.195 The Framework accounted for Syria’s decision to accede to the 
CWC and the Syrian authorities’ commitment to provisionally apply the 
Convention prior to its entry into force.196 The Agreement also ex-
pressed the U.S. and Russia’s “joint determination” to ensure that Syri-
an chemical weapons were destroyed in the “soonest and safest manner” 
with “stringent verification thereof.”197 Language in the Agreement re-
ferred to its stated provisions as “extraordinary procedures” necessitated 
by the prior use of CW as well as the ongoing Syrian Civil War.198 The 
Joint Paper called upon the OPCW to endorse the agreement for the dis-
armament of Syria’s CW, and it subsequently called for the UN Securi-
ty Council to reinforce the decision.199 The U.S. and Russia also called 
upon the UN to regularly review the implementation of the agreed upon 
plan, and in the event of non-compliance, to consider Chapter 7 use of 
force measures.200 
The Agreement supported the application of Article VIII of the 
CWC, which provided for the referral of any cases of non-compliance 
to the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council.201 The plan 
required Syria to give, within a week of the Agreement, a “comprehen-
sive” list that included the names, types, and quantities of its chemical 
weapons agents; types of munitions; and the location and form of stor-
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age, production, and research and development facilities.202 The Joint 
Paper affirmed that the OPCW would be the most effective engine to 
facilitate disarmament, and that destruction should take place outside of 
Syria.203 
The two states acknowledged that the Agreement laid out “ambi-
tious goals” for the removal and destruction of all categories of CW re-
lated materials and equipment with the objective of completing such 
removal and destruction in the first half of 2014.204 The Paper further 
stated that in order to achieve accountability for their chemical weap-
ons, Syria needed to provide the OPCW, the UN, and other supporting 
personnel with the “immediate and unfettered” right to inspect any and 
all sites, and that OPCW and UN personnel should be dispatched “as 
rapidly as possible” to support the control, removal, and destruction of 
Syria’s CW capabilities.205 The two states affirmed that they “intend[ed] 
to work closely together,” along with the OPCW, the UN, Syrian par-
ties, and other interested member states that had “relevant capabilities to 
arrange for the security of the monitoring and destruction mission,” 
while also “recognizing [the] primary responsibility of the Syrian Gov-
ernment in this regard.”206 The Agreement acknowledged that details to 
execute the framework still needed to be addressed, albeit on an “expe-
dited basis,” since “time [was] of the essence.”207 
b. OPCW and UN Adoption of the U.S.-Russia Framework 
Both the UN Security Council and the OPCW Executive Council 
endorsed the joint U.S.-Russia Framework on September 27, 2013 
through Security Council Resolution 2118.208 Resolution 2118 largely 
mirrored the agreement struck by the U.S. and Russia, calling for “full 
implementation of the 27 September decision of the Organisation for 
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the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which contain[ed] spe-
cial procedures for the expeditious and verifiable destruction of Syria’s 
chemical weapons,” and also for inspections to begin by October 1, just 
four days after which the Resolution was agreed upon.209 
The Council specifically “prohibited Syria from using, developing, 
producing, otherwise acquiring, stockpiling, or retaining chemical 
weapons, or transferring them to other States or non-State actors,” and 
emphasized that “no party in Syria should use, develop, produce, ac-
quire, stockpile, retain, or transfer such weapons.”210 The text also de-
manded that Syria comply with the OPCW’s decision, “notably by ac-
cepting personnel designated by OPCW or United Nations personnel 
and providing them with immediate and unfettered access to—and the 
right to inspect—any and all chemical weapons sites.”211 The Security 
Council also decided to “regularly review Syria’s implementation of the 
OPCW Executive Council decision and the present resolution, request-
ing the OPCW Director-General, through the Secretary-General, to re-
port to it within [thirty] days and every month thereafter.”212 The text 
pointed to Article VIII of the CWC to reaffirm the Security Council’s 
“readiness to consider promptly any reports of the OPCW” of cases of 
non-compliance of the CWC,213 as well as to impose Chapter 7 
measures in the event that Syria did not comply with the Resolution.214 
Other notable provisions of the OPCW Decision, adopted by the 
UN, were: (1) a call to inspect any other site identified by a State Party 
as having been involved in Syria’s CW program, unless unreasonable; 
(2) authorization to hire short-term, qualified inspectors and technical 
experts to implement the decision; (3) to meet within twenty-four hours 
if the UN Director-General reported delays on Syria’s part; and (4) to 
recognize that the decision was made due to the “extraordinary charac-
ter” of the situation posed by Syrian CW, and that it did not create prec-
edent for the future.215 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION 
The speed with which Resolution 2118 measures were implement-
ed was impressive, especially considering that many believed no 
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framework could bring about the disarmament of Syria,216 whose CW 
stockpile was one of the largest in the world.217 Secretary-General Ban 
described the operation as “the likes of which, quite simply, have never 
been tried before.”218  The CWC Executive Council called for the activi-
ties necessary for the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons program 
to start within the week.219 Syria extended an immediate invitation to re-
ceive a technical delegation from the OPCW and to cooperate with the 
OPCW in accordance with a provisional application of the CWC prior 
to its entry into force on Syria.220 In anticipation of the Security Council 
Resolution, Syria submitted detailed information on September 19, 
2013, concerning its chemical weapon stockpile, “including names, 
types, and quantities of its chemical weapons agents; types of muni-
tions; and location and form of storage, production, and research and 
development facilities.”221 
On October 1, 2013, exactly according to plan, an OPCW-UN ad-
vance team arrived in Damascus to oversee the destruction of Syria’s 
CW program.222 The Syrian government provided visas and facilitated 
the team’s transportation.223 The inspection team planned to complete 
verification of Syria’s CW production and storage facilities and oversee 
the destruction of Syria’s CW production, mixing, and filling equipment 
by November 1,224 and it aggressively aimed to eliminate Syria’s entire 
CW stockpile by June 2014.225 
The plan further called for the transportation of the most critical 
chemicals (“Category 1” chemicals) out of Syria by December 31, 
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2013, and for their destruction in descending order of risk that the 
chemicals posed.226 Chemical weapons facilities within Syria would be 
destroyed according to the same risk model, with all chemical weapons 
facilities also to be destroyed by June 2014.227 
The final phase, the actual destruction of the chemicals them-
selves, would be the most complex.228 The weapons were to be first 
packaged in “special containers” and transported across Lebanon’s bor-
der.  They would then travel by road from multiple location sites to Lat-
akia, Syria’s biggest port, where they were subsequently loaded onto 
ships provided by Norway and Denmark, and finally onto the Cape Ray, 
an American government-owned vessel. The Cape Ray had equipment 
capable of breaking down “lethal chemical agents into sludge similar to 
industrial toxic waste.”229 The biggest challenge from this phase was 
getting the chemical-filled containers to the port, since civil war hostili-
ties surrounded the main highway to the port.230 
Predictably, the OPCW altered some deadline goals due to the dif-
ficulties of disarming Syria in the midst of a civil war as well as en-
countering other setbacks along the way.231 The Syrian government, for 
example, missed a February 5, 2014 deadline to remove all of its most 
dangerous Category 1 chemicals (which included sulphur mustard and 
precursors for sarin nerve gas) from the country, and managed to re-
move only 11% by the deadline date.232 While all CW producing 
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equipment had been destroyed, Syria argued for destruction of CW pro-
duction and storage sites through inactivation, which essentially means 
“just locking some doors.”233 The OPCW, however, maintained that 
while the CWC does not define “destruction” of CW production and 
storage sites, the “OPCW ‘common law’ offers a definition that has 
come to mean ‘taken down to the foundations.’”234 
Other concerns included the possibility that Syria would maintain 
hidden stocks of CW and would remain hesitant to give a full history of 
its chemical weapons program as required by the CWC.235 Most alarm-
ingly, new reports of CW use arose in April 2014, alleging that the Syr-
ian regime had “dropped bombs filled with . . . chlorine gas in the rebel-
held village of Kfar Zita, injuring and terrifying [at least] dozens of ci-
vilians,” and potentially killing two children.236 Because of its wide-
spread industrial use, chlorine gas is not banned by the CWC; however, 
using chlorine to maim or kill would be a clear breach of the CWC.237 
While the identifying, gathering, and transporting of toxic material 
from twenty-three different sites through a war-torn country onto await-
ing ships “has gone in fits and starts,”238 important deadlines were met, 
and “much [was] achieved.”239 Syria met its October 27, 2013 deadline 
to submit a detailed and comprehensive declaration of its CW facilities 
along with a proposal to destroy its chemical arsenal.240 The OPCW ver-
ified that Syria had dismantled twenty-two of the twenty-three declared 
CW production sites, and that it had destroyed all of its declared CW 
production equipment by the November 1st deadline initially set by the 
U.S.-Russia Framework.241 The OPCW directed the verification of two 
sites remotely by live video, since they were unreachable due to war on 
the ground.242 The Syrian Government’s cooperation has been, accord-
ing to Sigrid Kaag, the Dutch diplomat leading the OPCW Mission in 
Syria, “all that could have been hoped for.”243 
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At last, achieving a “diplomatic and logistical milestone,” all of 
Syria’s CW, including the most dangerous chemicals, were removed 
from its borders on June of 2014.244 “Never before ha[d] a country’s en-
tire chemical arsenal been removed from its borders,”245 noted Wall 
Street Journal writer, Naftali Bendavid. All 1,290 metric tons of chemi-
cals were scheduled to be destroyed at various locations in the U.K., 
Finland, and the U.S., with some of the most dangerous chemicals to be 
destroyed aboard the Cape Ray, albeit four months after the original 
June 30th deadline.246 
International investment and cooperation from States Parties to the 
CWC has played a key role in the safe removal and destruction of 
chemicals. Tens of millions of dollars in donations were made to 
OPCW funds, and the States Parties also provided ships, vehicles, and 
personnel.247 Specifically, China, Denmark, Norway, Britain, Russia, 
and the U.S. provided technical and naval assistance to the Mission.248 
In a rare joint military mission, NATO and Russia made an arrangement 
to protect the American ship upon which CW destruction took place 
while it was out at sea.249 
V. ABLE MECHANISM: LESSONS FROM SYRIA ABOUT THE CHEMICAL 
WEAPONS CONVENTION 
While the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons is still under-
way and potential obstacles remain, the global intervention through the 
CWC framework demonstrates that the CWC is in fact a worthy mecha-
nism, realistically capable of ridding the world of chemical weapons. 
Even if efforts to destroy Syrian CW are further delayed, or if new CW 
is found in Syria, the above conclusion remains the same. Not only has 
the internal framework of the CWC enabled the disarmament of Syria in 
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an extremely challenging and hostile environment, but its ability to do 
so raises its status in such a way that drafters of future disarmament 
treaties should look to the CWC as a model.250 
1. Internal Capability 
The intervention from the international community in Syria 
demonstrated that the internal framework of the CWC itself, including 
its provisions and those entities responsible for implementing them, is a 
capable disarmament mechanism that will be further strengthened by its 
success in Syria.251 
First, in accordance with CWC provisions, the amount of interna-
tional cooperation and support has been monumental. Contrary to 
doubts about whether the States Parties would maintain the political will 
to enforce the CWC, a myriad of states have contributed to efforts in 
Syria through providing financial contributions, CW detection and de-
struction equipment, technical support, and transportation of the CW it-
self.252 The OPCW’s goal of disarming Syria has even brought tradi-
tional foes, NATO and Russia, together for a joint mission in order to 
help achieve that end.253 
In addition to international cooperation, the Syrian intervention 
demonstrated that the CWC framework does indeed have the technical 
capability to inspect, verify, and destroy a state’s CW in a short amount 
of time.254 The OPCW was on the ground in Syria to plan, inspect, and 
verify its CW declarations within a mere four days of Resolution 2118 
authorizing them to do so.255 It is likely that the OPCW and Technical 
Secretariat’s ability to mobilize incentivized Syria to accede to the 
CWC before the results of the initial UN investigation were released. 
Furthermore, the fact that the OPCW actually developed a plan for dis-
armament, and adaptively carried out that plan in the midst of a civil 
war only serves to strengthen its credibility. The OPCW demonstrated 
its dexterity by remotely verifying two CW facilities that were physical-
ly unreachable due to heavy combat.256 The OPCW has also forged 
ahead in executing an elaborate plan to transport and destroy CW out-
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side of Syria in the midst of its civil war, which has thus far led to the 
destruction of a significant portion of Syria’s CW.257 The OPCW has 
accomplished this despite “[n]ever in the history of [the OPCW]” hav-
ing “been called on to verify a destruction program within such short 
timeframes—and in an ongoing conflict.”258 
The intervention in Syria also furthered the goal of the CWC pro-
visions that call for universality, because Syria ultimately acceded to the 
CWC when it faced the threat of inspections and was encouraged from 
States Parties to accede.259 Not only did Syria accede to the treaty, but it 
also agreed to a provisional accession one month before the CWC for-
mally became binding on Syria.260 By acceding to the CWC, Syria es-
sentially received a “get out of jail free” card for having used CW since 
it avoided punishment by force.261 While allowing states to use CW 
without being punished is not something the CWC framework desires, 
ironically, the goal of CWC universality will more easily be achieved if 
states not party to the CWC know that if they use CW, they can avoid 
punishment by acceding to the CWC. On the other hand, States Party to 
the CWC have now seen in Syria how effective the framework can op-
erate to rid a country of CW, thereby deterring future CWC violators 
from using or secretly stockpiling CW. 
Furthermore, the Syrian intervention demonstrated that the com-
prehensive prohibitions and verification procedures set forth in the 
CWC are more than idealistic words. The prohibitions outlined in the 
CWC prohibit the development, production, acquisition, retention, 
stockpiling, transfer, or use of chemical weapons.262 The OPCW imple-
mented these prohibitions in Syria, essentially undertaking the immedi-
ate and total disarmament of Syria’s CW and CW facilities.263 The 
agreed upon plan for the disarmament of Syria was honest and deliber-
ate when it stated that the short time period and breadth of scope of the 
disarmament was an “ambitious goal.”264 The fact that the OPCW and 
larger CWC framework did not soften the conditions for disarmament, 
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and the fact that Syria has thus far been a willing participant,265 further 
bolsters the credibility of the CWC as a capable mechanism for the 
complete eradication of chemical weapons from the globe. 
Moreover, the Syrian intervention demonstrated that the provisions 
in the CWC do indeed allow flexibility in the means by which dis-
armament may be achieved. Rather than rigidly adhering to a traditional 
protocol, the provisions in the CWC encouraging regional agreements 
to bring States into the CWC framework allowed room for the U.S. and 
Russia to agree upon a joint plan for Syrian disarmament.266 Without the 
CWC provisions allowing flexibility, the U.S. would likely have been at 
odds with Russia and many other States Parties as to the proper re-
sponse to Syria’s CW use, and would likely have had to follow its own 
path, creating dissension and damaging the CWC framework in the pro-
cess. Because the CWC provisions encourage side agreements to 
achieve its object and purpose, the U.S. and Russia were able to agree to 
a plan which both felt would achieve disarmament, and to which Syria 
could trust and adhere. 
Lastly, in response to Masahiko Asada’s concern that the CWC 
would not be fully credible until States Parties had utilized the challenge 
procedure mechanism,267 the intervention in Syria essentially demon-
strates that the challenge inspection and verification system provided for 
in the CWC is indeed practicable and effective. While the initial inves-
tigation of CW use in Syria was under the authority of the Secretary-
General’s Mechanism since Syria was not yet party to the CWC, one 
can equate the investigation under the SGM with the challenge inspec-
tion mechanism under the CWC for several reasons. First, the interna-
tional community in a sense “challenged” that Syria had used chemical 
weapons in the Ghouta region. Only after this challenge did Syria allow 
inspectors into the region to investigate. Second, before the UN Mission 
team made the investigation results public, Syria acceded to the CWC 
and agreed to be provisionally bound by it one month before the CWC 
officially became binding upon it.268 The Syrian government then pro-
ceeded to open its borders to the OPCW team, declare all CW and CW 
facilities, and allow the process of their immediate verification and de-
struction.269 Thus, the Syrian intervention showed that the internal CWC 
framework is indeed fit for the task of universal disarmament in a con-
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stantly evolving world. 
2. External Effect of the CWC Framework as Applied in Syria 
Because the CWC framework enabled the peaceful disarmament in 
Syria, drafters of existing and future disarmament treaties should look to 
the CWC as a credible model to mirror. As discussed in part above, the 
CWC is “evolutionary compared with earlier treaties and international 
agreements.”270 Unlike the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the 
CWC is universal and “does not create a world of chemical apartheid in 
which a small group of countries holds legitimate possession of weap-
ons that are banned for everyone else.”271 Furthermore, unlike the Bio-
logical Weapons Convention (BWC), the CWC contains “rigorous,” 
ambitious, and “state-of-the-art provisions on monitoring and verifica-
tion.”272 The BWC has been unsuccessful in preventing the proliferation 
of biological weapons in part because of “weaknesses in its verification 
system.”273 
Efforts to strengthen both the NPT and BWC verification protocols 
were either ineffective or not adopted.274 While nuclear and biological 
weapons can cause more large scale harm than chemical weapons, thus 
making it harder for a state to surrender them, both the NPT and BWC 
should look to the CWC for inspiration that international agreement up-
on universal destruction is at least possible. Once states arrive at that 
premise, they could then look to the verification and challenge mecha-
nisms codified in the CWC, as well as to the real-world example in Syr-
ia, to see that those provisions can be used in appropriate, non-abusive, 
and effective ways. The demonstration of the effectiveness of the CWC 
framework in Syria could perhaps motivate drafters of the NPT, BWC, 
and future disarmament treaties to think in a way that allows for more 
aggressive disarmament provisions. 
3. Unintended Consequences 
The successful implementation of the CWC thus far in Syria is not 
without drawbacks. Ironically, successful verification and disarmament 
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in Syria could be its own Achilles’ Heel.  Assuming that Syria allowed 
a full inspection of its CW stockpile, states not party, such as Israel and 
Egypt, could be pressured to do the same if they became party to the 
CWC.275 Israel has not ratified the treaty due to national security con-
cerns.276 Egypt is believed to be equipped with mustard gas and some 
nerve agents.277 Both states could be put under the microscope to disarm 
should they become party to the CWC, which could act as a deterrent to 
their joining the CWC.278 
Furthermore, the effective intervention in Syria could subject the 
U.S. to a potential retaliatory challenge inspection279 to ensure that it is 
complying with its own destruction plan set to be complete by Septem-
ber 2023.280 If States Parties became hesitant to issue challenge inspec-
tions for fear of a retaliatory challenge, the CWC’s credibility would 
suffer, since states would be free to flagrantly violate the CWC without 
fear of being challenged.281 On the other hand, perhaps the Syrian inter-
vention can serve as a reminder that States Parties should speed up the 
work of getting rid of chemical weapons—especially if they are de-
manding that of others.282 
CONCLUSION 
Just before 2:30 a.m. on August 21, 2013, poison-filled rockets 
“streaked through the clear night sky” of the Damascus suburbs.283 Sarin 
gas, which instantly kills by attacking the nervous system, spread across 
sleeping farms and penetrated homes.284 “Men, women, and children 
began coughing and gagging, with little more than wet handkerchiefs 
and T-shirts to hold over their mouths.”285 Local doctors quickly ran out 
of antitoxins, and “in a desperate effort to wash away the poison, flood-
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ed clinic floors and dragged unconscious victims through the water.”286 
Over 1,400 deaths resulted from the attack, “making it the worst chemi-
cal-weapons strike in a quarter century.”287 The chemical attack in 
Ghouta, Syria, and the possibility of such an attack anywhere in the 
world, is why effective implementation and ultimate universality of the 
CWC is so important. 
As of October 2013, the OPCW had overseen the elimination of 
82% of the world’s declared stockpile of chemical weapons (58,172 
tons) and supervised the destruction of nearly 4.97 million munitions 
and containers.288 The OPCW has even won the Nobel Peace Prize for 
its mandate to oversee the destruction of Syria’s chemical arsenal in the 
midst of a civil war.289 The CWC framework deserves such praise for 
enabling the stringent verification and destruction of Syrian CW thus 
far. 
If one can step back to take a bird’s-eye view of the Syrian situa-
tion before any proactive international response, several courses of ac-
tion were possible: (1) a unilateral U.S. military strike, (2) a non-UN 
joint military strike, (3) a non-military UN action such as sanctions, and 
(4) leaving the matter to be resolved internally in Syria. Only the CWC 
framework, through which the U.S. and Russia were able to negotiate, 
and to which Syria voluntarily acceded, enabled a deal for the peaceful 
removal and destruction of chemical weapons from Syria. 
The Syrian intervention demonstrated not only that the CWC pro-
visions and mechanism allowed for the flexibility, adaptability, and 
technical capability for, and that the States Parties had the shear politi-
cal will to bring about total disarmament in Syria, it also proved that the 
CWC is capable to bring about chemical disarmament across the world. 
Furthermore, the Syrian intervention brings a level of credibility to the 
CWC to which drafters of current and future disarmament treaties 
should look to for guidance. Rather than a “dinosaur of international re-
lations” from the Cold War, the CWC is a “model for multilateral un-
dertakings to build global consensus in the field of international security 
through disarmament.”290 The Syrian intervention gives the CWC a “ris-
ing breeze buffeting its sails”291 in the eyes of the international commu-
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nity. Let us hope that the breeze grows stronger, and that all states jump 
onboard the ship. 
 
IMPLEMENTATION, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES 177, 183 (Ramesh Thakur & Ere Haru 
eds., 2006).  
